The Social Shaping of Technological Revolutions
Second Machine Age
Second Machine Age or Fifth Technological Revolution? (Part 8). The limits of the Brynjolfsson and McAfee policy recipes: Proposals on fiscal stability and welfare
Second Machine Age of Fifth Technological Revolution? Different interpretations lead to different recommendations – reflections on Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee’s book The Second Machine Age (2014)
Part Eight: The limits of the Brynjolfsson and McAfee policy recipes: Proposals on fiscal stability and welfare
In this post I continue discussing the policy recommendations in Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee’s influential book, The Second Machine Age (2014). The previous ones focused on human capital and on science, technology and infrastructure. This one will concentrate on their proposals on taxation and welfare.
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Fiscal stability and welfare: taxation and the social safety net
TAXATION: Yes, tax the superstars, but shouldn’t we make a radical transformation of the whole tax system?
In the section on taxation, we see again that it is not that Brynjolfsson and McAfee do not have recommendations that are good, if very specific, for adjustments to the current system. They prescribe Pigovian taxes (taxing the ‘bads’) on pollution, congestion, and so on; a tax on land and higher income taxes for high earners (the ‘superstars’). All these suggestions are useful; the latter two have been in and out of favour as policy options since the first Industrial Revolution and are now clearly necessary to reduce the levels of inequality.
The pollution taxes are to be welcomed. As mentioned above, this is perhaps the first time they take the environment into account. Nevertheless, they limit their discussion to contaminants and to time wasted on congested roads (increasing potential pollution) – in other words, to ‘negative externalities’, while ignoring the elephant in the room. They do not touch the risks of climate change or of limits to natural resources. Since they declare that “we don’t pretend that the policies we advocate here will be easy to adopt in the current political climate”, one can surmise that they are avoiding the risk of controversy. Whatever the reason, limiting action to minor band-aid solutions will not do.
Taxing land rents is also a good thing, but they argue in favour because “such taxes are relatively efficient— they don’t distort incentives or activities” (p. 225). Yet they had just supported Pigovian taxes precisely because they “distort” incentives and activities in favour of health and against harming society. The notion of distortion really depends on perspective. Taxes have long been used to promote certain industries over others; to promote the use of machines rather than labour; to reduce smoking and so on.
Somewhat different in purpose is the third ‘wise’ tax that Brynjolfsson and McAfee recommend: raising the marginal income tax rate on superstars. Since it was introduced in Britain in 1999, during the wars with revolutionary France, there have been different reasons for applying income tax – and different understandings of the results of its application. Most see it as a way to raise funds for the State and those opposing it are either against state intervention or hold that it reduces private investment by ‘crowding it out’. However, in the US after WWII, top marginal taxes were extremely high, as much as 93% (see figure 8.1) and they did not stop investment, which was a relatively stable average of 16% of GDP until 1970. After that, taxes were cut (the top rate went down to 70% and then to 40%) and investment only averaged 17% of GDP in a bumpy bubble ride (varying between 13 and 20%) [FRED data].
Figure 8.1
Historical graph of the marginal tax rates for the highest and lowest income earners, 1913-2009
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